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by David B. Richards
This	paper	questions	the	generally	held	belief	that	there	are	significant	passenger	fare	savings	and	
increased	passenger	traffic	growth	due	to	airline	deregulation.		Unlike	previous	studies,	passengers	
and	passenger	 fares	are	broken	 into	discrete	distance	 intervals	and	compared	 to	passenger	and	
fare	distributions	prior	 to	deregulation.	 	 	Except	 for	 the	period	 immediately	before	 the	 terrorist	
attack	in	2001	and	continuing	through	2005,	there	are	limited,	if	any,	demonstrable	domestic	system	
passenger	fare	savings.  Also	in	contrast	to	other	papers	showing	significant	passenger	fare	benefits,	
virtually	all	data	for	this	paper	is	accessible	via	the	Internet.
INTRODUCTION
It is surprising that anyone expected fares to fall with the advent of airline deregulation.  This 
conclusion directly differs from the economic maxim, “Charge what the market will bear.”  In 
addition, since the start of the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI) in 1970, most of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board’s (CAB) major activities in the pricing area had dealt with the development 
of economic criteria that would basically suppress fare increases unless those criteria were met. 
That suppression was removed with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA).  
Deregulation was presented as an opportunity for consumers to benefit from lower fares and 
improved service as federal regulatory constraints were removed.  Federally regulated fares were 
unfavorably compared to lower non-federally regulated fares in California and Texas, with little 
notice paid to the more severe price regulation in California, nor to the general monopoly intra-state 
services granted by the public utility commissions of both states.  There was little effort by the pro-
deregulation CAB to provide guidance.  Because lower fares and higher traffic were predicted to 
occur because of deregulation, studies designed to measure such results began to proliferate shortly 
after airline deregulation occurred. 
These studies invariably have something in common -- unrealistic assumptions about what the 
regulated fare level would have been had regulation continued and relatively weak analysis of traffic 
growth and yield.  Because the constructed regulatory fare was invariably too high, a comparison to 
deregulated fare levels has always shown large savings.
Domestic industry data for traffic and price are shown below; overall traffic is measured by 
revenue passenger-miles, and price is measured by revenue per revenue passenger-mile, or yield 
(see Figures 1 and 2).  Changes in cost and productivity are briefly examined to determine if there 
are significant cost savings or productivity increases that would have allowed lower prices to the 
consumer after deregulation. 
Following the cost and productivity information is a discussion of rate-setting policies under 
the Civil Aeronautic Board’s (CAB) Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI)(1975) and 
updates to the DPFI fare level after deregulation under the Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL), a 
fare zone of reasonableness standard required by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)(U.
S. Congress 1978).  Market concentration and its relationship to the SIFL are briefly examined. 
Estimates of passenger fare premiums or savings after deregulation, derived from the CAB and the 
U.S. Department of Transportation’s 10% passenger ticket survey, incorporate the SIFL.  
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PASSENGER TRAFFIC BETWEEN 1951 AND 2005
Below is a graph of domestic industry revenue passenger-miles in logarithmic scale.  A straight 
line on a logarithmic graph indicates a constant rate of change.1   Two visually fitted lines have 
been added for emphasis, 1951-1979 and 1979-2005.  One could fit alternate lines, but it would 
be difficult to show greater growth in traffic for periods after deregulation than before.  The rate of 
traffic growth has clearly not increased, despite the relative increase in passenger circuity caused by 
the general adoption of the hub-spoke system.   
AVERAGE YIELD PER PASSENGER-MILE BETWEEN 1950 AND 2005
Average domestic real yield per passenger-mile shows a relatively continuous decline since the 
middle-to-late 1960s, with a slight flattening from about 1994 through 2000.  The decline in 
average yield has often been presented as a benefit of airline deregulation, with little analysis of 
the yield decline before airline deregulation, or whether that decline would have continued after 
deregulation.
While there does not appear to be any marked change in trend with airline deregulation in 
1979, this does not mean there were no changes in the fare structure.  Morrison and Winston (1995), 
Borenstein and Rose (forthcoming), and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2006), among 
others, have documented a significant increase in market fare dispersion after deregulation.  This 
should not be surprising.  The cost disallowances for discount fares under regulation (discussed under 
the DPFI, below) were removed, allowing lower discount fares, and the fare ceiling proscriptions 
were cancelled, allowing significant increases in premium fares, including regular coach fares. 
Average fares, however, tend to net out both fare reductions and increases. 
LEVEL OF INPUT COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY AFTER AIRLINE DEREGULATION
One of the major determinants of yield is the level of the input costs that must be recovered to 
operate profitably.  While there are a number of major cost elements that could be considered for 
Figure 1: Domestic Industry Revenue-Passenger Miles, 1951-2005 (millions)
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics and predecessors.
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analysis, historically cost per available seat-mile was a major regulatory standard, often measured 
indirectly through load factor standards (also discussed under the DPFI below).  Cost per seat-mile 
was separated between fuel and non-fuel costs, both because fuel was a major exogenous cost 
component, and because carriers were presumed to exercise more control over other cost elements. 
This was continued after deregulation with the Congressional requirement that a cost index, the 
Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL, also discussed below), be regularly computed by the regulatory 
authorities.  The SIFL index continued the separation of fuel and non-fuel cost components.
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Figure 2: Domestic Industry Nominal and Real Yield per Passenger-Mile, 1950-2005
    (CPI-U, 1982-84 = 100)
Source: Air Transport Association (www.airlines.org/economics/finance/PaPricesYield.htm)
Figure 3: Fuel, Non-fuel, and Total Cost per Seat-Mile (SIFL Methodology),
    July 1979 – January 2006
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As can be seen above, fuel costs increased immediately after deregulation, but declined to 
approximate pre-deregulation levels by 1983, and had limited variation from 1986 through 2003. 
There were brief spikes due to oil supply shortfalls.  The major component of rising total cost 
was the increase in non-fuel cost.  Figure 4 shows the unit costs per available seat-mile for major 
cost categories for the major and national domestic passenger carriers between 1971 and 2005. 
(Transport-related expenses are not shown because of the inclusion of commuter affiliate expenses 
in industry data.) 
Except for the period 1981-1986 (during and immediately after the largest increase in average 
aircraft size during the period 1971-2005), and the industry restructuring that occurred after 2002, 
unit labor cost generally stayed the same approximate percentage of total cost (38.0% in 1979, 
33.8.1% in 2000).  There is disagreement as to whether this represents the continued ability of labor 
unions to extract a wage premium.  In any case, the payment of increased wages by the air carriers 
as opposed to incurring a strike was likely due to two factors.  First, as market competition increased 
with the removal of carrier route constraints after deregulation, a carrier shutdown for a strike meant 
the immediate loss of market share that would become more difficult to regain the longer the strike. 
Second, the carrier Mutual Aid Pact, under which a carrier would pay a portion of its gains due to 
another carrier taking a strike, was removed by the Deregulation Act.2   The result was an increasing 
wage level generally unrelated to general inflation or increased productivity.
Determining the cause of changes in productivity after deregulation is problematic.  Historically, 
productivity has been measured as available ton-miles per employee, because carriers tended to 
provide both freight and passenger scheduled and charter services.  Few passenger carriers now 
provide separate freight services, and there are limited charter passenger services.  Productivity 
is now generally measured in available seat-miles (ASM) per employee.  Some have measured 
efficiency gains (losses) through changes in passenger load factor.  However, load factor is partly 
determined by the size of the aircraft.  While significant increases in load factor have occurred after 
deregulation, most of that increase was the result of a marked reduction in aircraft seats per aircraft-
mile.  The 13.8 percentage point gain in load factor between 1983 (59.6%) and 2004 (74.4%), is 
only about one percentage point more than the 12.9 % reduction in average aircraft size over the 
same period (1983, 163.1 seats; 2004, 142.1 seats).  Here the use of available seats per mile per 
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Figure 4: Unit Cost per Available Seat-Mile for the Domestic Major and National Air   
    Carriers, 1971-2005
Source: Air Transport Association (http://airlines.org/economics/finance/CostIndex.htm)
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full-time employee equivalents will be used as a surrogate for productivity, as provided by the Air 
Transport Association and similar to that used by the GAO.  
Figure 5 compares ASM per employee and average seats per aircraft-mile.  As can be seen, 
the largest increases in productivity, except for the period following the industry restructuring in 
2001-2004, occurred during and immediately after one of the largest increase in average aircraft 
size (1981-1983) since the introduction of jet aircraft.  The productivity increase can be attributed, 
in some part, to the lingering effects of the PATCO strike in 1981 (the controller’s strike reduced the 
number of available takeoff/landing positions at major airports, causing carriers to increase the use 
of larger aircraft where operations were constrained.)  Since average aircraft size has been declining 
since 1983, it is likely that productivity’s return to trend by 1990 reflected the gradual loss of aircraft 
size efficiencies.  In any case, there does not appear to be any structural increase in productivity until 
the carrier reorganizations in 2002. 
This short examination of elements contributing to cost or productivity and which would affect 
average yield does not show any specific items which would support a claim that the period after 
deregulation has resulted in a lower average yield through cost reduction or productivity increases. 
Average yield, however, is an average; the effect of changes in passenger fares and yield by mileage 
interval that contribute to that average is examined in the following sections. 
THE DOMESTIC PASSENGER FARE INVESTIGATION RATE-SETTING 
ADJUSTMENTS
The DPFI was triggered in 1969 by Congressional complaints requesting a fare investigation to 
determine the reasonableness of costs and load factor in calculating the fare level.  The General	
Passenger	Fare	Investigation (20 C.A.B. 291, 1960), had not decided these issues.  As an interim 
action, the CAB required a mileage-based fare formula similar to American Airlines be adopted 
system-wide (Order 69-9-68).  Order 70-2-121 set nine separate proceedings for hearing: Aircraft 
Depreciation, Leased Aircraft, Deferred Federal Income Taxes, Joint Fares, Discount Fares, Load 
Factor and Seating Configurations, Fare Level, Rate of Return, and Fare Structure.  With Board 
decisions on each phase of the DPFI, less discretion was left to air carriers with regard to pricing, 
Source: Air Transport Association (http://airlines.org/economics/traffic/Annual+US+Traffic.htm) and  U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Traffic	Statistics	of	Certificated	Route	Air	
Carriers, selected issues.
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service, and structural initiatives that would not result in the disallowance of cost for rate-setting 
purposes.  With the completion of the DPFI in 1974, the DPFI rate-setting procedures were an 
almost mechanical exercise designed to provide an analysis of passenger fare increase requests by 
air carriers without the CAB or its staff having to review a large number of rate-making decisions. 
Among other requirements, normal coach fares were to be offered on a formula rate, declining in 
cost-per-mile as distance increased; be based on a 55% full-fare load factor, with discount passenger 
data adjusted to reflect carriage at full fares; and include disallowances for less than standard aircraft 
seating or aircraft utilization.3 Carriers were to be permitted a 12 % rate-of-return (ROI) on their 
regulatory investment base, at the statutory 48% tax rate.  As economic data had a reporting lag, 
costs were generally projected to a tariff’s effective date.  The effect of these economic adjustments 
for the year ended December 1977, projected to August 1, 1978, is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Actual and DPFI Adjusted Data for the Year Ended December 1977
Actual
Seats and 
Utilization
Discount 
Fares
Past Fare 
Increases
Cost 
Escalation
RPM’s (millions) 127,008 127,008 120,312 114,866 114,866
ASM’s (millions) 229,373 237,010 218,776 208,847 208,847
Load Factor (%) 55.37 53.59 54.99 55.00 55.00
Yield (Cents/RPM) 8.623 8.623 8.996 9.623 9.623
Pass. Revenue $10,952,162 $10,9652,162 $10,823,600 $11,053,797 $11,053,797
Other Revenue $170,063 $170,063 $170,063 $170,063 $170,063
Operating Revenue $11,122,227 $11,122,225 $10,993,663 $11,223,860 $11,223,860
Capacity Expense $7,092,108 $7,085,748 $6,614,835 $6,314,727 $6,736,573
Non-Cap. Expense $3,611,279 $3,611,279 $3,458,103 $3,311,101 $3,530,945
Oper. Expense $10,703,387 $10,697,027 $10,072,938 $9,625,828 $10,267,518
Oper. Profit $418,838 $425,198 $920,725 $1,598,032 $956,342
Interest Expense $186,990 $185,933 $172,738 $164,965 $164,965
Earnings Before Tax $231,848 $239,265 $747,987 $1,433,067 $791,377
Tax at 48% $111,287 $114,847 $359,034 $687,872 $379,861
Net Income $120,561 $124,418 $388,953 $745,195 $411,516
Return Element $307,551 $310,351 $561,689 $910,159 $576,480
Investment $5,992,117 $5,965,985 $5,550,489 $5,298,672 $5,298,672
ROI (%) 5.1 5.2 10.1 17.2 10.9
Note: Dollar amounts in thousands.
Source:U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board,	Analysis	of	Domestic	Trunk	Performance	in	Accordance	With	the	
Standards	Set	Forth	in	the	Domestic	Passenger	Fare	Investigation, Year Ended December 1977.
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Note the results of these adjustments.  Both traffic (RPM) and capacity (ASM) were reduced 
by about 10%, yield was increased by a cent, operating expense reduced by about a billion dollars 
(before cost escalation), and ROI after cost escalation more than doubled.  A fare increase request 
greater than about 1% would have been denied because the carriers did not meet efficiency standards, 
even though reported ROI was less than half the regulatory standard of 12%. 
THE STANDARD INDUSTRY FARE LEVEL
One of the requirements of the ADA in its phased implementation of airline deregulation was that 
the CAB had to establish a “Standard Industry Fare Level” based on fares in effect on July 1, 1979. 
The CAB was to periodically update the SIFL by the percentage change in unadjusted operating 
cost per available seat-mile. This essentially voided the extensive economic adjustments made to 
carrier operating results under the rate-setting policies of the DPFI in determining permissible fare 
increases prior to deregulation. The SIFL was to apply to all fare classes offered on July 1, 1977, but 
in practice was applied only to the unrestricted coach fare. 
 The SIFL is basically an index of unadjusted carrier operating cost per available seat-mile, with 
its base period the year ended July 1, 1979.  There are no cost disallowances, revenue enhancements, 
or return on investment criteria as in the DPFI.  The index is then applied to the DPFI fare formula 
of July 1, 1979, to determine the allowable ceiling fare. One important thing to remember, however, 
is that the DPFI formula effective on July 1, 1979, included all of the rate-making adjustments of the 
DPFI, which became imbedded in the SIFL. Leaving aside adjustments to expense, the regulatory 
yield, or formula rate, was 11.6 % higher than reported yield (Table 1, $0.09623/$0.08623).  In 
addition, the SIFL essentially was based on a regulatory ceiling fare level that represented an actual 
carrier return on regulatory investment of only 5.1%.
However, because carriers need to cover average costs with average fares to remain in business, 
the SIFL and average yield closely track one another, as shown in Figure 6.  Exceptions are limited. 
Yield was above the SIFL from 1980-1985, and significantly below the SIFL starting with the 
weakening of demand in 2000 and continuing with the loss of traffic, markedly reduced fares, and 
horrendous carrier losses following the terrorist attack in 2001.
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AN ALTERNATIVE USE OF THE SIFL TO GENERATE PASSENGER FARE SAVINGS
Since the mileage-based fares under the SIFL were developed from the existing DPFI mileage-
based fare formula, one can use the SIFL to estimate changes in carrier pricing that differ from 
the regulatory formula levels. One such methodology is shown below.  It is not a complete 
“counterfactual” study, as it shows only annual passenger gains or losses in 1984 and 1988 and 
annual and second quarter results from 1997 to 2006, compared to the regulatory fare structure 
effective in 1979. A true counterfactual study would make the regulatory economic adjustments 
required under the DPFI and compare that to the current fare level.
The construction of passenger gains and losses uses only the SIFL and Origin-Destination	Survey	
of	Airline	Passenger	Traffic (Survey) data, both available electronically from the DOT’s website, 
and the average 1979, 1984, and 1988 fare/SIFL data from the  DOT’s Secretary’s	Task	Force	on 
Competition	in	the	U.S.	Domestic	Airline	Industry	(1990). While fare estimates incorporating the 
SIFL have previously been used in other studies to represent the coach fare, this study corrects for 
their misapplication of the SIFL as the average regulatory fare, and their failure to measure changes 
in fare differential by mileage interval. The results below are based upon the pre-deregulation 
relationship of average fares to the DPFI formula rate, by mileage interval.
The DPFI fare formula set unrestricted coach fares, with premium fares (first class) a percentage 
of coach.  However, full coach fares also included night coach, Continental’s “K” class fares, other 
unrestricted coach fares (intra-state), and children’s and military fares.  As a result, average full fares 
developed from carrier submissions (weighted by passenger-miles) under the DPFI were about 85% 
of the DPFI formula rate as follows:  1976- 84.5%, 1977- 83.8%, and 1978- 80.8% (understated 
because of missing first class data).  In 1977 discount fares, with an average stage length 50% longer 
than full fares, averaged less than 70% of the formula rate; the total average fare was about 80% of 
the formula rate.
While slightly higher, comparing average fares in 1979 by mileage interval from the survey 
to the SIFL supports an approximate 0.85 ratio of average fare to formula rate (1979 was the first 
year carriers reported fare data in the survey.) For comparative purposes, similar data are shown 
below for 1984 and 1988 from the U.S. DOT Competition Study (1990), and annual data for every 
second year from 1998-2004, plus 2005. Second quarter data from 1997-2006 are contained in the 
appendix. The weighted average is weighted by passenger-miles by mileage category. Weighting 
by passengers increases the weighted average by about five percentage points. For any particular 
mileage block there is no difference in effect between using passengers or passenger-miles.
Table 2: Ratio of Average Fares to SIFL by Mileage Block for Selected Annual Periods
Mileage Block 1979 1984 1988 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
0-250 0.976 0.946 1.362 1.381 1.403 1.169 1.325 1.331
251-500 0.947 0.964 1.181 1.068 1.082 0.939 1.045 1.039
501-750 0.966 1.132 1.169 1.083 1.063 0.902 0.961 0.952
751-1,000 0.926 0.957 0.968 0.971 0.931 0.779 0.817 0.798
1,001-1,500 0.850 0.800 0.837 0.880 0.847 0.689 0.697 0.670
1,501-2,000 0.818 0.797 0.683 0.828 0.777 0.592 0.584 0.604
Greater Than 2,000 0.729 0.762 0.612 0.824 0.787 0.543 0.510 0.538
Weighted Avg. 0.861 0.874 0.859 0.929 0.899 0.706 0.723 0.726
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Secretary’s	Task	Force	on	Competition	in	the	U.S.	Domestic												
Airline	Industry, Pricing, Table I-5, and annual data developed from DB1 of the Survey.
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As indicated in Table 2, the ratio of the average fares to SIFL by mileage block changes markedly 
in the 10 years after deregulation.  Under regulation, with the exception of first class fares, carriers 
could not offer fares above the formula rate.  A ratio over 1.0, while theoretically possible, could 
only occur if there were a sufficiently high proportion of premium traffic to outweigh normal fares. 
Therefore, any ratio above 1.0 is an indication average fares are above regulatory ceiling levels.  A 
ratio higher than that experienced in 1979 is an indication fares were higher than regulatory levels, 
and any ratio less than those shown in 1979 indicates a general reduction in fare level.  Table 2 also 
indicates there were average fare premiums of between 6% and 40% in markets below 750 miles 
between 1988 and 2000.
The SIFL, however, being based on the DPFI fare taper, does contain a price bias.  The DPFI 
fare formula deliberately under-priced short-haul fares and overpriced long-haul ones, and the 
successor SIFL would contain that same bias.    Under regulation, carriers were able to offset the 
DPFI under-pricing of shorter-haul flights by restricting the use of discount fares and by having 
higher load factors (see Figure 12.4 of Morrison and Winston 1995).   This may even have aided the 
under-pricing of long-haul flights, since the DPFI 55% full-fare load factor standard was based on 
system data.  In any case, that bias would have remained had regulation continued. 
The basis of this paper is that any increase in the average fare/SIFL ratio after deregulation would 
reduce consumer welfare, any reduction would enhance it. Thus, according to Table 2, consumer 
welfare fell between 1979 and 2000 in markets below 1,000 miles, and generally rose in markets 
greater than 1,000 miles. There are mixed results after the terrorist attacks in 2001.  By 2005 only 
markets under 500 miles were above the 1979 base ratio, with very significant reductions in many 
ratios.  The weighted average ratio in 2005 is more than 20 percentage points below that of 1998.   
About half of all passengers transported between 1984 and 2000 were carried in distance 
intervals where the average fares were above constructed SIFL levels.  Table 3 shows the percentage 
of passengers above SIFL for selected years and quarters.  On an annual basis, the terrorist attacks 
in 2001 reduced the proportion of short-haul passengers carried above SIFL from 43.3% in 2001 
to only 5% in 2002, and, while rebounding in 2003, fell to about 25% in 2004 and 2005. Quarterly 
passengers followed a similar pattern, with passengers paying above the SIFL rising to 40.9% of the 
total in the second quarter of 2006.
Table 3:  Percent of Passengers Carried in Mileage Blocks
Where the Average Fare was Above SIFL
Annual Data Quarterly Data
Year % Year % Year %
2nd
Quarter %
1979 0.0 1997 50.1 2002 5.0 2001 45.9
1984 56.8 1998 49.6 2003 41.7 2002 5.0
1988 50.6 1999 48.5 2004 24.9 2003 41.9
2000 47.2 2005 25.5 2004 24.8
2001 43.3 2005 25.9
2006 40.9
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Secretary’s	Task	Force	
on	Competition	in	the	U.S	Domestic	Airline	Industry, Pricing, Table 
I-5, annual summary of quarterly data from the Origin-Destination	
Survey	of	Airline	Passenger	Traffic, Table 1, and Appendix.
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Both traffic and yield fell precipitously after the terrorist attacks in 2001 (see Figures 9 and 
10). Carriers were generally able to raise prices from their lows in 2000 in short-haul markets, 
likely due to the relatively high level of market concentration in those markets. Table 4 shows 
the weighted market share of the largest carrier in a market (Chicago-New York) and airport pair 
(Newark-O’Hare) for the second quarters of 2002, 2005, and 2006. Concentration in both city and 
airport pairs has increased for markets over 1,000 miles from 2002 to 2006, with airport pairs 
significantly more concentrated overall.
Table 4: Weighted Market Share of the Largest Carrier in a Market, Selected Quarterly   
 Periods
Mileage Interval City-Pairs Airport-Pairs
2Q2002 2Q2005 2Q2006 2Q2002 2Q2005 2Q2006
0-250 63.3 62.8 62.8 75.3 77.7 80.8
251-500 71.8 71.5 71.1 80.3 77.7 79.3
501-750 59.0 58.0 55.7 65.5 64.1 65.7
751-1,000 58.4 55.1 55.0 65.1 65.8 66.6
1,001-1,500 51.0 53.3 55.4 61.9 63.8 65.8
1,501-2,000 48.4 49.5 51.9 54.5 59.2 64.3
Greater Than 2,000 40.0 44.7 46.5 49.6 54.3 60.1
Total 57.3 57.2 57.5 64.9 65.7 68.0
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation Origin-Destination	Survey	of	Airline	Passenger	Traffic, 
Table 1, 1A.  Selected quarters are from (www.ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/X-50%20Role_files/
consumerairfaresreport.htm).
The relationship of SIFL formula rates to carrier pricing is complex, and includes a carriers’ 
pricing philosophy as well as cost structure and competition.  The tables below compare Southwest’s 
and American’s relationship of airport-pair fares to SIFL fares by mileage interval where each carrier 
is the carrier with the largest market share.  Only airport-pairs with greater than 10 passengers per 
day and only distance intervals in which there are at least five markets are included. 
Table 5:  Comparison of Southwest’s Airport-Pair Fares to SIFL by Mileage Block 
Mileage Interval Daily
Pass.
Airport-Pair 
Markets
Weighted 
Apt. Share
Average
Fare
SIFL
Fare
% Diff.
from SIFL
0-250 9,574 13 95.6 $97.17 $82.62 17.6
251-500 12,235 28 96.2 $98.63 $112.59 -12.4
501-750 6,038 26 90.4 $133.24 $160.49 -17.0
751-1,000 6,324 27 75.4 $127.99 $203.60 -37.1
1,001-1,500 7,654 42 80.2 $144.20 $255.21 -43.5
1,501-2,000 4,962 22 92.5 $149.64 $326.06 -54.1
Greater Than 2,000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Total 46,787 158 89.5 $119.63 $170.91 -19.7
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Table 6: Comparison of American’s Airport-Pair Fares to SIFL by Mileage Block
Mileage Interval Daily
Pass.
Airport-Pair 
Markets
Weighted 
Apt. Share
Average
Fare
SIFL
Fare
% Diff.
from SIFL
0-250 2,627 23 86.7 $119.47 $81.95 45.8
251-500 5,193 29 73.6 $148.71 $116.62 27.5
501-750 8,036 47 68.3 $189.11 $164.91 14.7
751-1,000 10,200 54 69.2 $213.13 $202.15 5.4
1,001-1,500 24,240 90 66.1 $211.12 $254.77 -17.1
1,501-2,000 4,475 47 60.0 $247.76 $325.55 -23.9
Greater Than 2,000 4,209 33 82.0 $325.50 $444.45 -26.8
Total 58,980 323 69.2 $209.83 $232.47 -9.7
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Domestic Aviation, Second Quarter, 2006, Table 1A 
(http://www.ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/X-50%20Role_files/consumerairfarereport.htm).
Southwest’s philosophy of basically unrestricted low fares and use of less-congested airports 
allows it to reduce costs and monopolize airport-pair markets.  Compare airport-pair concentration 
levels between Southwest and the industry in Tables 4 and 5 and American in Tables 4 and 6. 
Southwest’s weighted ratio of its fares to SIFL is -19.7%, not much below the -15% difference 
shown under regulation.  Southwest’s airport-pair concentration level is more than 20 percentage 
points higher than American’s or the industry.
CONSTRUCTION OF PASSENGER SAVINGS AND COMPARISON TO DOMESTIC 
MAJOR PASSENGER CARRIER OPERATING PROFIT AND LOSS
Shown above are differences in fares by percentage and level by mileage block from the SIFL and 
market concentration and fare levels for two diverse air carriers from the survey. Changes in the 
ratio of actual fares to SIFL will be used to estimate passenger savings between 1979 and selected 
periods in two stages. First, passenger savings will be estimated by using the difference between 
actual fares and the SIFL. That savings will be adjusted by the difference between the DPFI formula 
rate and the actual fares under regulation. Both the passenger savings and adjusted passenger savings 
use average fares and sample passengers from the survey by mileage interval. Figure 7 shows the 
annual sum of the adjusted passenger gain or loss for all mileage blocks for the top 1,000 city-pairs 
for 1984, 1988, and 1998-2005, compared to domestic major air carrier operating profit or loss for 
the same period. Annual survey data is the sum of the reported quarterly data, except for 1984 and 
1988 which are from the competition study.
Annual adjusted passenger savings are shown to be inversely related to domestic major carrier 
operating profit.  Using second quarter data (the second quarter of the year most closely corresponds 
to yearly data) to show the effects of the carrier fare increases in 2005 and 2006 supports this inverse 
relationship between carrier profit and adjusted consumer savings (Figure 8).  Quarterly passenger 
fare saving and loss computations are contained in the appendix.
The factors that turned a consumer loss of $1 billion a quarter in 2000 into a gain of $700 million 
in 2001, and nearly double that through 2005, were the initial reduction of demand in 2000, and 
the very marked fall in passenger numbers and fare levels after the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001.  Below are shown the origin-destination passengers (Figure 9) and the ratio of actual 
passenger fares to the SIFL (Figure 10) for selected second quarters between 2000 and 2006, and 
including 1979 as a reference base for the SIFL ratio.
Note that the shorter-haul passengers (0-750 miles) in 2002, 2004 and 2006 are below the 2000 
levels, and most remain below up to 1,000 miles.  Longer-haul passengers partially recovered in 
2002, and are markedly higher in 2004 and 2006 in markets over 1,000 miles than in 2000. 
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Figure 7: Annual Adjusted Passenger Fare Savings and Domestic Major Passenger Carrier   
 Operating Profit or Loss, 1984, 1988, and 1997-2005 (millions of dollars) 
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Source: Appendix and U.S. Department of Transportation Airline	Quarterly	Financial	Review,	selected 
 issues.
The three years prior to the terrorist attacks, 1998, 2000, and the reference year 1979 are shown 
with solid lines.  2002, 2004, and 2006 have broken lines.  Note the marked structural shift in the ratio 
after 2000.  While all fares fell in 2002 compared to the SIFL, long-haul fares fell disproportionately, 
and did not recover as readily.  Because fewer short-haul passengers were carried at a premium 
(and more under-priced long-haul passengers were carried), the previous cross-subsidy from high-
fare concentrated short-haul markets to more competitive long-haul markets failed, and the carriers 
incurred huge losses. Those under-priced long-haul markets, however, generated considerable 
passenger savings (Figure 5). In 2006, the fare/SIFL ratio surpassed previous highs below 500 
Figure 8: Adjusted Passenger Fare Savings and Domestic Major Carrier Operating Profit 
 or Loss, Second Quarter 1997-2006 (millions of dollars) 
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Figure 9: Second Quarter Origin-Destination Passengers By Mileage Block, Selected Years
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Figure 10: Ratio of Average Fare to SIFL by Mileage Block, Second Quarter, Selected Years
miles, with smaller upward shifts in all other mileage categories from the low levels following the 
terrorist attacks in 2001.  They have not recovered sufficiently in markets over 1,000 miles to allow 
recovery of costs.
DIFFERENCES FROM OTHER STUDIES SHOWING LARGE CONSUMER SAVINGS
Most other studies showing the effect of deregulation on consumer welfare basically conclude that 
there are considerable passenger price savings due to the effects of increased competition (number 
of competitors), gains in productivity (output/employee), and efficiency (load factor). Offering 
comments on this collection of studies is not realistic. The comments below address specific 
problems in the construction of passenger fare savings in one of the most quoted works, Morrison 
and Winston (1995), and a well-written draft paper likely to be published later in 2007 by Borenstein 
and Rose.
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While Morrison and Winston (1995) present their counterfactual overall passenger fare savings 
of $12 billion per year in 1993 dollars on page 82, their fare savings methodology is presented 
in pages 11-14.  The authors first adopt the post-deregulation SIFL fare formula as the basis for 
regulated fares.  They then assume that deregulation increased productivity 1.2% a year, based on 
productivity changes between 1976 and 1983 developed by Caves et al. (1987).  The actual SIFL 
was then increased by this 1.2% a year from 1976 to 1983 to remove this purported benefit of 
deregulation.  (1983 was evidently the midpoint of the 1979-1993 estimating period, and the 1.2% 
annual productivity increase to the SIFL (8.7% by 1983) was then stopped to “…err on the side of 
conservatism.”)   Though not stated, it appears the 8.7% productivity offset was continued from 
1983 through 1993.  This increased SIFL fare formula is used to construct regulated fares from the 
same passenger data base used to construct actual yield (U.S. Department of Transportation, Origin-
Destination	Survey	of	Airline	Passenger	Traffic).  No data are presented, and the study results cannot 
be replicated.
There are several obvious problems: the use of a productivity offset; the failure to recognize 
that the precursor DPFI formula to the SIFL was not the selling fare but a ceiling fare; pre-dating 
the SIFL to 1976; and not recognizing the change in passenger mix by distance over time.  Dealing 
with productivity first, the authors evidently did not recognize that productivity increases are more 
likely to be affected by increases in aircraft size than changes in carrier operations.  Domestic 
average aircraft seats per mile increased 21.1 % between 1976 and 1983.  The peak year for average 
domestic aircraft size was 1983; size has declined every year since then.  Since the book was printed 
in 1995, actual productivity figures could have been used for the entire study period 1979-1993. 
However, those purported significant increases in productivity due to deregulation disappeared after 
1983 with the start of the reduction in aircraft size.  See Figure 5 above, where changes in average 
seats per aircraft mile and ASM/employee are compared, and the recent study of productivity by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-630, (2006) (Figure 6). 
In addition, part of that productivity increase would have been captured under regulation 
through the rate-making adjustments of the DPFI, and would have served to reduce the regulatory 
fare level.  This adjustment is counter-intuitive in any case, since the hub-spoke systems developed 
under deregulation are more labor intensive than linear systems.  There should be no “productivity” 
adjustment to the SIFL. 
The SIFL, as an extension of the DPFI fare formula, represents the coach ceiling fare.  Average 
full fares under the DPFI were about 15% below the formula rate (See Table 2, above).  Use of the 
SIFL formula to represent the regulatory fare level thereby overstates that fare level by a minimum 
of 15%.  Morrison and Winston’s (1995) study now contains two positive structural biases for 
the regulatory fare estimate: the SIFL offset for a productivity increase (8.7%) and the difference 
between charged and ceiling formula rates (15%).  
Finally, the SIFL did not exist until Order 79-6-96 was issued (U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board 
1979).  Increasing the SIFL was not possible prior to that date.  Fare increases allowed by the CAB 
through May 1979 were under the DPFI, and included significant regulatory cost disallowances, 
including that for discount fares.  Increases in discount traffic under the DPFI would depress the 
ceiling fare level unless those discounts could overcome the generation/diversion adjustments.  It is 
disingenuous to suggest that more discount fares immediately before deregulation would increase 
the regulatory ceiling fare formula.  Because no data were presented, the effect of this miscalculation 
is unknown, but it is the third bias in the study increasing the “regulated” fare level.  (The shift in 
passenger mix by distance will be ignored, since developing a true counterfactual passenger mix is 
beyond the scope of this paper.)   
Borenstein and Rose (forthcoming) also base their counterfactual estimate of regulated fare 
levels on the SIFL.  They also use the actual passengers and fares reported in the DOT’s O-D 
Survey, DB1A, and construct a counterfactual fare estimate using the SIFL fare formula.  For 2005, 
they estimate that consumers saved some $28 billion, with fares some 30% below regulatory levels 
(see their page 12 and Figure 4).  
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While a more straight-forward approach than that followed by Morrison and Winston (1995), 
there are some similar problems.  First, as with Morrison and Winston (1995), they equate the SIFL 
formula with the regulatory fare level.  As previously indicated, the DPFI formula overstates the 
average regulated full fare by some 15%, and overstates formula yield to actual yield by about 20%. 
In addition, the abrupt change in passenger mix after the terrorist attacks (less short-haul passengers 
paying premiums and more long-haul ones well below cost) distorts fare comparisons after 2001. 
This is evident in the significant widening of the SIFL/actual fare gap in their Figure 4.  While the 
percentage difference in the Borenstein and Rose study between actual and SIFL formula yield 
(30%) agrees with that of the methodology adopted in the appendix for annual data (a ratio of .705 
actual/formula revenues) in 2005, the level of the savings does not.4   
This is due to a larger passenger base in Borenstein and Rose (Borenstein and Rose use the 
entire DB-1 of the Origin-Destination	Survey	of	Airline	Passenger	Traffic, the appendix uses the 
largest 1,000 market subset from DB-1, available on DOT’s webpage), and the use of a -1.5 demand 
elasticity adjustment.  A -1.5 price elasticity for airline travel is very high, and likely unrealistic.5
Borenstein and Rose do, however, recognize that there are weaknesses in developing a true 
counterfactual against which to judge airline deregulation.  They recognize the differing effects 
productivity and changes in load factor may have had on the SIFL and counterfactual economic 
results.  More importantly, they recognize that it is possible airline regulation would have evolved, 
similar to electricity regulation.  (See their discussion of these issues on pages 12 and 13.)
It is likely service restrictions would have been eased and there would have been some 
accommodation for differing service quality/fare tradeoffs.  On the other hand, some decisions by 
the pro-deregulation CAB in the late 1970s presaged the undercutting of long-haul nonstop service 
pricing so prevalent in today’s hub-spoke system (Texas International’s “Peanuts” fares, Order 77-2-
133), and offset the regulatory flexibility inherent in the DPFI to accept different rate-setting criteria 
(Delta’s “Aerobus” fares, Order 77-11-124).  
CONCLUSION
This paper makes clear that the grant of pricing freedom to the airline industry has generally resulted 
in average prices being higher than they would have been had regulation continued under the DPFI 
rate-setting policies.  It is also clear that the terrorist attacks caused air carriers to sufficiently reduce 
fares to attract passengers and that there have been considerable passenger savings, albeit with large 
air carrier losses.  However, significant structural changes have also occurred in air carrier operations 
and pricing since the terrorist attacks.  It is not yet clear whether these changes will result in continued 
consumer savings, or whether the significant increases in fares over the past year (second quarter 
2006 yield is up 9.8% from 2005 for the domestic majors), will allow carriers to continue their 
return to the relationships between fares and SIFL established shortly after deregulation. Should 
they be able to re-establish their old pattern of pricing, the passenger benefits of recent years will be 
reduced or eliminated. 
Endnotes
1.   In long-term trend analysis, one is generally interested in whether growth rates are increasing or 
declining.  An arithmetic graph increases in scale by a fixed amount, such that an increase from 
10 to 100 and 100 to 1,000 will show markedly different effects in level, even though the rate 
of growth is the same.  A logarithmic graph shows equal vertical distance on the graph for equal 
percentage changes in growth, in which significant increases in level may not equate to marked 
increases in growth rates.  In aviation, there was no increase in growth	rates	with deregulation, 
though the level did increase significantly.  This is best illustrated by the use of a logarithmic 
graph.
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2.   The CAB immunized Mutual Aid Pact (Pact) permitted participating air carriers (basically all 
trunk lines except Delta) to pay to a struck carrier the difference between its increased revenue 
received during that strike and applicable direct expenses incurred.  Revisions to the Pact 
eventually guaranteed a minimum payment to a struck carrier of a specific portion of its normal 
operating expenses.  Several air carriers, most notably Northwest and National, took repeated 
strikes, and had among the lowest labor expenses of the trunklines.  The ability of air carriers to 
receive a cross-subsidy when struck was well recognized by labor unions.
3.   The most severe of the rate-making adjustments was for discount fares. As the DPFI was 
essentially developed to control prices of full-fare traffic, the discount fare adjustment used a 
generation/diversion methodology to estimate what portion of discount traffic was diverted from 
full fares, and what portion was newly generated. This “break-even” percentage applied a yield 
elasticity estimate of -0.7 as follows: Breakeven Percentage = 1-(Ratio) / 1-.3(Ratio), where 
Ratio equaled the ratio of actual discount fare yield to the full-fare yield at the discount fare 
mileage.  The Breakeven Percentage was then applied to the total discount traffic, separating it 
into generated and diverted portions. Generated traffic was removed, and associated revenue, 
expense, tax, and return elements were adjusted. 
4.   Table 1 (top 1,000 market-pairs) of the Origin-Destination	Survey	of	Airline	Passenger	Traffic 
on DOT’s website contains 795,897 average daily passengers for the fourth quarter of 2005. 
Table 6, all markets with at least 10 daily passengers, contains 6,566 pairs and 1,041,754 average 
daily passengers. There are 2,908 excluded markets, containing some 226,440 passengers. Table 
1’s ratio to the total is 62.8%. That ratio, applied to the $16.1 billion annual fare savings for Table 
1 passengers in 2005, would increase the approximate current-dollar passenger savings in this 
paper to about $25.6 billion, before adjustment for the 1979 ratio of fares to SIFL.
5.   On a domestic system basis, air travel is not shown to be price-elastic.  Using an additive 
regression form with RPM’s as the dependent variable and real GDP and Yield as independent 
variables (1965-2004), the resulting equation is RPM’s = 6.63 + 0.903RGDP- 2.527RYield; 
R2adj=97.71; DW= 0.332.  Correcting for serial correlation through the use of first-differences, 
using a multiplicative regression form, and reducing the time period to 1980-2000 results in: 
dLogRPM’s= -7.702 + 1.154dLogRGDP - 0.488dLogRYield; R2adj=64.8, DW= 1.727.  Other 
formulations using different measures of wealth (disposable personal income, non-farm 
employment) and time intervals show similar results.  Some markets may have fare elasticities 
greater than 1.0, the industry does not.  The CAB used an elasticity estimate of -0.7 in adjusting 
discount passengers to full-fare levels in the DPFI.
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APPENDIX
METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING CONSUMER GAIN OR PREMIUM BY PERIOD
A Comparison of Current Fares to the Fare Structure Effective in 1979
Quarterly Data from Origin-Destination Survey of Airline Passenger Traffic, Top 1,000 City-Pairs
The Consumer Gain or Premium for any mileage interval by period after deregulation is determined by comparing the actual fare to the SIFL fare, 
and multiplying the difference by the passengers in the distance interval.  The pre-deregulation Gain or Premium by mileage block is determined by 
multiplying the SIFL fare by the 1979 fare/SIFL ratio, constructing a regulatory average fare, and multiplying the difference between the SIFL and 
that constructed fare by the passengers in the distance interval.  The pre-deregulation Gain or Premium is then subtracted from the post- 
deregulation Gain or Premium to determine the net effect of airline deregulation.
Quarterly Data: Second Quarter for each year 1997-2006
Distance Interval 0-250 251-500 501-750 751-1,000 1,001-1,500 1,501-2,000 Over 2000 Total
A.1. 2006 GAIN OR LOSS AT 2006 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 218 372 629 884 1,176 1,732 2,362
  Avg. Fare $120.61 $130.10 $166.20 $172.24 $180.80 $216.28 $255.77
  SIFL Fare $83.00 $114.89 $161.77 $202.03 $248.14 $334.52 $430.15  
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.45317 1.13238 1.02739 0.85253 0.72862 0.64654 0.59460 0.76371
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $37.61 $15.21 $4.43 -$29.79 -$67.34 -$118.24 -$174.38
  Passengers 3,782,663 15,598,164 12,240,593 13,139,795 16,041,219 7,647,908 8,902,626 77,352,967
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $142,274 $237,229 $54,237 -$391,482 -$1,080,222 -$904,270 -$1,552,454 -$3,494,688
A.2. 2006 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  2005 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $81.03 $108.76 $156.21 $186.99 $210.98 $273.76 $313.71
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.97 -$6.13 -$5.56 -$15.04 -$37.16 -$60.76 -$116.44
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$7,442 -$95,611 -$68,063 -$197,659 -$596,133 -$464,650 -$1,036,598 -$2,466,155
  2005 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $149,716 $332,840 $122,299 -$193,822 -$484,089 -$439,621 -$515,856 -$1,028,532
B.1. 2005 GAIN OR LOSS AT 2005 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 219 371 627 884 1,175 1,734 2,361
  Avg. Fare $106.58 $113.96 $146.57 $153.34 $159.76 $192.46 $221.94
  SIFL Fare $77.39 $106.66 $150.15 $187.88 $230.60 $311.35 $399.88  
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.37719 1.06840 0.97613 0.81615 0.69280 0.61815 0.55501 0.72473
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $29.19 $7.30 -$3.58 -$34.54 -$70.84 -$118.89 -$177.94
  Passengers 4,168,082 15,688,345 11,837,180 12,850,884 15,699,211 7,635,874 8,734,599 76,614,174
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $121,669 $114,453 -$42,420 -$443,885 -$1,112,132 -$907,835 -$1,554,262 -$3,824,413
B.2. 2005 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  2005 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $75.55 $100.97 $144.99 $173.89 $196.06 $254.80 $291.64
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.83 -$5.69 -$5.16 -$13.99 -$34.54 -$56.55 -$108.24
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$7,646 -$89,278 -$61,093 -$179,772 -$542,183 -$431,790 -$945,468 -$2,257,230
  2005 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $129,315 $203,730 $18,674 -$264,113 -$569,949 -$476,045 -$608,795 -$1,567,183
C.1. 2004 GAIN OR LOSS AT 2004 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 216 366 628 884 1,175 1,736 2,365
  Avg. Fare $104.00 $113.26 $147.94 $156.94 $164.43 $181.52 $205.17
  SIFL Fare $76.81 $105.70 $150.30 $187.88 $230.60 $311.63 $400.45
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.35396 1.07151 0.98430 0.83532 0.71305 0.58248 0.51235 0.70948
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $27.19 $7.56 -$2.36 -$30.94 -$66.17 -$130.11 -$195.28
  Passengers 3,240,556 14,399,799 11,045,555 11,731,166 14,657,434 7,495,655 8,534,807 71,104,972
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $88,106 $108,839 -$26,072 -$362,976 -$969,882 -$975,284 -$1,666,660 -$3,803,929
C.2. 2004 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  2004 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $74.99 $100.06 $145.13 $173.89 $196.06 $255.03 $292.05
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.82 -$5.64 -$5.17 -$13.99 -$34.54 -$56.60 -$108.40
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$5,900 -$81,205 -$57,063 -$164,108 -$506,204 -$424,246 -$925,146 -$2,163,873
  2004 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $94,006 $190,045 $30,991 -$198,868 -$463,678 -$551,038 -$741,514 -$1,640,056
Passenger Fare Savings

D1. 2003 GAIN OR LOSS AT 2003 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 216 366 628 884 1,177 1,738 2,358
  Avg. Fare $99.91 $110.62 $149.66 $159.70 $170.85 $186.31 $230.88
  SIFL Fare $75.61 $104.05 $147.96 $184.95 $227.29 $307.04 $393.22
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.32132 1.06311 1.01152 0.86349 0.75169 0.60679 0.58715 0.75416
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $24.30 $6.57 $1.70 -$25.25 -$56.44 -$120.73 -$162.34
  Passengers 3,043,795 13,543,502 10,195,272 10,554,226 12,705,209 6,730,654 7,139,448 63,912,106
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $73,953 $88,932 $17,373 -$266,473 -$717,038 -$812,605 -$1,159,032 -$2,774,890
D.2. 2003 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  2003 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $73.82 $98.50 $142.87 $171.18 $193.25 $251.28 $286.78
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.79 -$5.55 -$5.09 -$13.77 -$34.04 -$55.77 -$106.44
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$5,455 -$75,185 -$51,849 -$145,339 -$432,478 -$375,335 -$759,929 -$1,845,571
  2003 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $79,409 $164,117 $69,222 -$121,134 -$284,559 -$437,270 -$399,103 -$929,319
E.1. 2002 GAIN OR LOSS AT 2002 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 215 367 629 883 1,177 1,733 2,361
  Avg. Fare $99.74 $108.22 $148.09 $158.51 $175.48 $204.00 $250.87
  SIFL Fare $82.74 $114.36 $162.48 $202.76 $249.39 $336.13 $431.84
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.20546 0.94634 0.91144 0.78175 0.70363 0.60691 0.58094 0.71449
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $17.00 -$6.14 -$14.39 -$44.25 -$73.91 -$132.13 -$180.97
  Passengers 3,152,342 13,893,746 10,429,931 10,448,345 11,979,365 6,087,809 6,785,900 62,777,438
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $53,590 -$85,252 -$150,080 -$462,379 -$885,421 -$804,377 -$1,228,020 -$3,561,940
E.2. 2002 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  2002 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $80.78 $108.25 $156.89 $187.67 $212.04 $275.08 $314.94
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.96 -$6.10 -$5.58 -$15.10 -$37.35 -$61.05 -$116.89
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$6,183 -$84,766 -$58,249 -$157,741 -$447,430 -$371,648 -$793,227 -$1,919,243
  2002 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $59,772 -$486 -$91,831 -$304,638 -$437,991 -$432,730 -$434,793 -$1,642,697
F.1. 2001 GAIN OR LOSS AT 2001 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter) 
  Avg. Distance 210 369 627 888 1,186 1,727 2,357
  Avg. Fare $105.06 $113.44 $160.32 $167.46 $184.49 $219.30 $274.10
  SIFL Fare $79.24 $111.37 $157.31 $197.42 $243.19 $325.13 $418.30
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.32585 1.01859 1.01913 0.84824 0.75862 0.67450 0.65527 0.79224
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $25.82 $2.07 $3.01 -$29.96 -$58.70 -$105.83 -$144.20
  Passengers 5,147,597 17,575,285 12,176,619 13,156,962 13,223,665 7,105,462 7,617,883 76,003,473
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $132,911 $36,381 $36,652 -$394,183 -$776,229 -$751,971 -$1,098,499 -$2,814,938
F.2. 2001 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  2001 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $77.36 $105.43 $151.90 $182.72 $206.77 $266.08 $305.07
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.88 -$5.94 -$5.41 -$14.70 -$36.42 -$59.05 -$113.23
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$9,669 -$104,428 -$65,840 -$193,398 -$481,622 -$419,579 -$862,567 -$2,137,102
  2002 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $142,580 $140,809 $102,492 -$200,784 -$294,607 -$332,392 -$235,932 -$677,836
G.1. 2000 GAIN OR LOSS AT 2000 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 211 371 626 886 1,186 1,730 2,365
  Avg. Fare $107.79 $117.09 $159.87 $176.39 $197.88 $239.16 $310.93
  SIFL Fare $74.47 $104.73 $147.29 $184.78 $228.04 $305.20 $393.21
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.44743 1.11806 1.08542 0.95459 0.86774 0.78362 0.79075 0.90459
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $33.32 $12.36 $12.58 -$8.39 -$30.16 -$66.04 -$82.28
  Passengers 5,484,479 18,059,678 12,966,754 13,037,681 13,032,110 7,036,757 7,657,650 77,275,109
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $182,742 $223,288 $163,132 -$109,402 -$393,064 -$464,693 -$630,064 -$1,028,061
G.2. 2000 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  2000 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $72.70 $99.14 $142.23 $171.02 $193.89 $249.77 $286.77
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.77 -$5.59 -$5.06 -$13.76 -$34.15 -$55.43 -$106.44
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$9,681 -$100,904 -$65,647 -$179,376 -$445,079 -$390,048 -$815,060 -$2,005,795
  2000 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $192,424 $324,192 $228,779 $69,974 $52,015 -$74,645 $184,996 $977,734
Passenger Fare Savings

H.1. 1999 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1999 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 211 371 627 883 1,182 1,733 2,367
  Avg. Fare $100.22 $110.77 $154.28 $174.50 $193.64 $243.39 $296.08
  SIFL Fare $69.82 $98.19 $138.23 $172.84 $213.27 $286.55 $368.97
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.43540 1.12814 1.11611 1.00959 0.90797 0.84938 0.80245 0.94296
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $30.40 $12.58 $16.05 $1.66 -$19.63 -$43.16 -$72.89
  Passengers 5,370,729 17,048,941 11,781,497 11,422,775 11,867,583 5,996,263 6,666,387 70,154,175
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $163,269 $214,505 $189,088 $18,944 -$232,918 -$258,799 -$485,913 -$391,825
H.2. 1999 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  1999 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $68.17 $92.95 $133.48 $159.97 $181.33 $234.51 $269.09
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.65 -$5.24 -$4.75 -$12.87 -$31.94 -$52.04 -$99.88
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$8,889 -$89,310 -$55,978 -$147,003 -$379,047 -$312,065 -$665,813 -$1,658,105
  1998 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $172,157 $303,815 $245,066 $165,946 $146,129 $53,266 $179,900 $1,266,280
I.1. 1998 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1998 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 211 371 628 884 1,184 1,734 2,370
  Avg. Fare $96.47 $104.23 $149.92 $166.85 $188.61 $232.12 $299.73
  SIFL Fare $68.52 $96.36 $135.80 $169.77 $209.58 $281.37 $362.52
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.40783 1.08163 1.10401 0.98282 0.89996 0.82497 0.82679 0.93451
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $27.95 $7.87 $14.12 -$2.92 -$20.97 -$49.25 -$62.79
  Passengers 5,246,150 16,916,900 11,410,035 10,959,494 11,248,510 5,843,292 6,110,832 67,735,213
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $146,609 $133,068 $161,160 -$31,967 -$235,845 -$287,773 -$383,711 -$498,459
I.2. 1998 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  1998 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $66.90 $91.22 $131.13 $157.13 $178.19 $230.27 $264.39
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.62 -$5.14 -$4.67 -$12.64 -$31.39 -$51.10 -$98.13
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$8,521 -$86,972 -$53,258 -$138,532 -$353,059 -$298,605 -$599,660 -$1,538,607
  1998 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $155,130 $220,041 $214,418 $106,565 $117,213 $10,832 $215,949 $1,040,148
J.1. 1997 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1997 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  Avg. Distance 211 370 626 883 1,182 1,733 2,217
  Avg. Fare $94.17 $103.13 $143.97 $160.66 $177.31 $226.86 $241.63
  SIFL Fare $68.33 $95.92 $135.14 $169.14 $208.70 $280.41 $341.97
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.37820 1.07522 1.06534 0.94986 0.84960 0.80904 0.70658 0.90828
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $25.84 $7.22 $8.83 -$8.48 -$31.39 -$53.55 -$100.34
  Passengers 5,201,196 16,123,926 10,586,394 10,155,691 10,586,394 5,477,472 2,792,881 60,923,954
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $134,407 $116,334 $93,480 -$86,129 -$332,292 -$293,305 -$280,244 -$647,751
J.2. 1997 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Second Quarter)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  1997 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $66.71 $90.80 $130.49 $156.55 $177.44 $229.48 $249.40
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.62 -$5.12 -$4.65 -$12.59 -$31.26 -$50.93 -$92.57
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$8,424 -$82,509 -$49,175 -$127,898 -$330,884 -$278,955 -$258,532 -$1,136,377
  1997 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $142,831 $198,843 $142,655 $41,769 -$1,408 -$14,351 -$21,712 $488,627
Annual Data for !979, 1984, 1988
AA.1. 1988 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1988 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Annual data)
  Avg. Distance 199 364 628 882 1,183 1,732 2,364
  Avg. Fare $74.02 $91.91 $129.78 $134.22 $143.44 $157.01 $181.15
  SIFL Fare $54.34 $77.82 $111.06 $138.62 $171.28 $229.87 $295.79
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 1.36216 1.18106 1.16856 0.96826 0.83746 0.68304 0.61243 0.85928
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare $19.68 $14.09 $18.72 -$4.40 -$27.84 -$72.86 -$114.64
  Passengers 22,315,520 48,662,250 28,600,620 27,998,300 35,248,960 16,485,950 17,543,350 196,854,950
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ $439,169 $685,651 $535,404 -$123,193 -$981,331 -$1,201,166 -$2,011,170 -$2,656,635
AA.2. 1988 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Annual data)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  1988 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 5/ $53.05 $73.67 $107.24 $128.30 $145.63 $188.12 $215.72
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.29 -$4.15 -$3.82 -$10.32 -$25.65 -$41.75 -$80.07
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$28,744 -$202,036 -$109,180 -$288,977 -$904,194 -$688,272 -$1,404,645 -$3,626,048
  1988 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ $467,913 $887,687 $644,584 $165,784 -$77,137 -$512,894 -$606,524 $969,413
Passenger Fare Savings
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AB.1. 1984 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1984 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Annual data)
  Avg. Distance 197 360 629 879 1,180 1,726 2,380
  Avg. Fare $53.17 $77.35 $130.74 $137.60 $142.09 $190.03 $235.55
  SIFL Fare $56.18 $80.28 $115.54 $143.74 $177.69 $238.31 $309.27
  Ratio: Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare 0.94642 0.96350 1.13156 0.95728 0.79965 0.79741 0.76163 0.87403
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare -$3.01 -$2.93 $15.20 -$6.14 -$35.60 -$48.28 -$73.72
  Passengers 22,026,490 41,568,020 19,803,440 18,534,690 24,947,640 9,722,190 10,250,020 146,852,490
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ -$66,300 -$121,794 $301,012 -$113,803 -$888,136 -$469,387 -$755,631 -$2,114,040
AB.2. 1984 GAIN OR LOSS AT 1979 RATIO OF ACTUAL FARE TO SIFL (Annual data)
  1979 Fare/SIFL Ratio 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931
  1984 Fare at 1979 Fare/SIFL ratio 5/ $54.85 $76.00 $111.57 $133.04 $151.08 $195.03 $225.55
  Difference from SIFL 2/ -$1.33 -$4.28 -$3.97 -$10.70 -$26.61 -$43.28 -$83.72
  Wtd. Premium $(000) 3/ -$29,332 -$178,038 -$78,647 -$198,367 -$663,898 -$420,795 -$858,091 -$2,427,167
  1984 Pass. Penalty $(000) 4/ -$36,968 $56,243 $379,659 $84,564 -$224,238 -$48,593 $102,459 $313,127
AC. 1979 DIFFERENCE FROM SIFL (Annual data)
  Avg. Distance 191 364 626 881 1,172 1,725 2,365
  Avg. Fare $39.54 $56.07 $81.47 $97.58 $110.08 $142.75 $164.27
  SIFL Fare $40.50 $59.23 $84.37 $105.43 $129.47 $174.43 $225.24
  Ratio: Avg.Fare/SIFL Fare 0.97630 0.94665 0.96563 0.92554 0.85024 0.81838 0.72931 0.86051
  Difference: Avg. Fare less SIFL Fare -$0.96 -$3.16 -$2.90 -$7.85 -$19.39 -$31.68 -$60.97
  Passengers 16,622,460 27,598,850 16,976,990 15,023,200 18,769,640 7,668,720 7,822,610 110,482,470
  Passengers/4 (Estimate for 2nd Qtr.) 4,155,615 6,899,713 4,244,248 3,755,800 4,692,410 1,917,180 1,955,653 27,620,618
  Wtd. Premium ($000) 1/ -$15,958 -$87,212 -$49,233 -$117,932 -$363,943 -$242,945 -$476,945 -$1,354,168
1/  Fare difference, times passengers.
2/  Current SIFL fare, less SIFL fare at 1979 Avg. Fare/ SIFL Fare Ratio. 
3/  Fare Difference at 1979 Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare Ratio, times current passengers.
4/  Wtd. Premium in current period, less Wtd. Premium at 1979 Avg. Fare/SIFL Fare Ratio in current period.
5/   SIFL Fare in current period, times 1979 Avg. Fare to SIFL Ratio.   
Note: Weighted SIFL fare formula by distance interval by year are:
    1979: $19.81+ 0.1083(0-500 miles)+ 0.0826(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.0794(GT 1,500 miles)
    1984: $27.04+ 0.1479(0-500 miles)+ 0.1128(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1085(GT 1,500 miles)
    1988: $26.02+ 0.1423(0-500 miles)+ 0.1085(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1043(GT 1,500 miles)
Second Quarter (unweighted):
    1998: $31.61+ 0.1740(0-500 miles)+ 0.1327(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1276(GT 1,500 miles)
    1999: $32.41+ 0.1773(0-500 miles)+ 0.1352(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1300(GT 1,500 miles)
    2000: $34.57+ 0.1891(0-500 miles)+ 0.1442(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1386(GT 1,500 miles)
    2001: $36.88+ 0.2017(0-500 miles)+ 0.1538(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1479(GT 1,500 miles)
    2002: $38.02+ 0.2080(0-500 miles)+ 0.1586(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1524(GT 1,500 miles)
    2003: $34.66+ 0.1896(0-500 miles)+ 0.1455(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1390(GT 1,500 miles)
    2004: $35.21+ 0.1926(0-500 miles)+ 0.1469(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1412(GT 1,500 miles)
    2005: $35.21+ 0.1926(0-500 miles)+ 0.1469(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1412(GT 1,500 miles) (same as 2004)
    2006: $37.85+ 0.2071(0-500 miles)+ 0.1579(501-1,500 miles)+ 0.1518(GT 1,500 miles)
